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Territorial Disputes and Nationalism:  
A Comparative Case Study of China and 
Vietnam 
Hannah Cotillon 
Abstract: In autocracies, nationalism appears to have merged with geo-
political thinking. In light of this geopoliticisation of nationalism, it is 
surprising that the literature has paid virtually no attention to the role of 
territorial disputes as a conditioning factor. The present study seeks to 
further enhance the field by factoring in the role of territorial disputes in 
triggering different expressions of nationalism. It develops an analytical 
framework for typologies of nationalism according to four territorial 
disputes: China’s dispute with Vietnam over maritime territory in the 
South China Sea, China’s dispute with Japan over maritime territory in 
the East China Sea, Vietnam’s dispute with Cambodia over territorial 
border demarcations, and Vietnam’s dispute with China over maritime 
territory in the South China Sea. The respective disputes of China and 
Vietnam are analysed and tested against criteria of expressions of nation-
alism in autocracies. We find that territorial disputes and therefore exter-
nal context are important conditioning factors of nationalism in autocra-
cies.  
  Manuscript received 22 January 2017; accepted 31 March 2017 
Keywords: China, Vietnam, nationalism, territorial disputes 
Hannah Cotillon is a postgraduate student reading international affairs 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Last year she 
completed a master’s degree course at Peking University, where she 
focused her research on Chinese foreign policy and Southeast Asian 
affairs. She is particularly interested in expressions of nationalism in 
Asian autocracies and how they both influence and are influenced by the 
ruling government.  
E-mail: <h.cotillon@lse.ac.uk>; <hannah.cotillon@gmail.com> 
 
  
  52 Hannah Cotillon 
 
Introduction 
The strong anti-Japanese protests that occurred throughout China’s main 
cities in the late summer of 2012 attracted considerable attention from 
scholars of nationalism in autocracies. In a similar vein, the anti-Chinese 
protests of May 2014 that escalated into violent riots in South Vietnam 
solicited a wide range of interpretations. Scholars have been seeking to 
explain what factors caused these particularly strong expressions of na-
tionalism. Moreover, these demonstrations of anti-foreign nationalism 
have materialised against the backdrop of shifting geopolitical conditions 
in East Asia. China has become increasingly assertive in its foreign policy, 
especially regarding maritime territorial sovereignty in the East and South 
China Seas (Swaine 2010; Pham 2011; Yahuda 2013). Vietnam has made 
a significant shift towards alliance politics to counter China’s assertive-
ness and military superiority. Indeed, as a defiant claimant of maritime 
territory in the South China Sea, Hanoi has sought to strengthen its mili-
tary and security partnerships with the Philippines, Japan and the US 
(Hiep 2016: 271–272, 280–281; Panda 2014; Britz 2015). The simultanei-
ty between stronger expressions of nationalism and more assertiveness in 
foreign policy has prompted scholars to shift from realpolitik to more 
domestic-centred explanations of foreign policy, focusing on nationalism 
as a central factor. Hence, previous studies have used discourse analysis 
to measure the impact of structural characteristics of autocracies such as 
Vietnam and China on expressions of nationalism.  
Any analysis of regional security in East Asia requires a deeper un-
derstanding of what conditions expressions of nationalism in China and 
Vietnam. In fact, nationalism itself has merged with geopolitical thinking. 
“Geopolitik” nationalism likens the state to a living organism that re-
quires geopolitical space of its own in order to develop and function. 
This approach sees national interest, and therefore nationalism, as being 
characterised by the territorialisation of space (Hughes 2011: 620). For 
Vietnamese and Chinese leaders, territorial disputes have become a test 
of national pride; a lack of assertiveness could be politically damaging. 
(Hughes 2011; Kurlantzick 2015). Thus, the geopoliticisation of national-
ism suggests that the role of territorial disputes is a major factor of ex-
pressions of nationalism in China and Vietnam. Accordingly, the present 
study examines the context surrounding expressions of nationalism. 
Context is understood here as ongoing circumstances, such as territorial 
disputes, that occur outside the domestic political realm. As such, it seeks 
to further enhance the field by factoring in the role of territorial disputes 
in triggering different typologies of nationalism.  
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Rather than revoking previous theories on expressions of national-
ism in autocracies, this paper integrates those theories into its focus on 
context. The emphasis on territorial disputes as a conditioning factor for 
nationalism will be made through an analytical framework constructed 
from the structural characteristics of China and Vietnam. Using dis-
course analysis, the framework will examine two of China’s territorial 
disputes and two of Vietnam’s territorial disputes against sets of criteria 
pertaining to expressions of nationalism. As such, the framework con-
tributes to the field of nationalism in autocracies by examining how terri-
torial disputes impact on expressions of nationalism, instead of the other 
way around. The hypothesis put forward here is that expressions of 
nationalism in China and Vietnam are sensitive to the dispute in question.  
Firstly, I set out the theoretical background that will serve to build 
the analytical framework. Societal institutions, regime type and historical 
consciousness are central structural characteristics of China and Vietnam 
that greatly influence expressions of nationalism. The second section 
presents the territorial disputes that will be examined. These are China’s 
dispute with Vietnam over maritime territory in the South China Sea, 
China’s dispute with Japan over maritime territory in the East China Sea, 
Vietnam’s dispute with Cambodia over territorial border demarcations, 
and Vietnam’s dispute with China over maritime territory in the South 
China Sea. The third section introduces the analytical framework, which 
consists of three sets of criteria, all based on the structural characteristics 
of China and Vietnam. In order to examine whether expressions of na-
tionalism in China and Vietnam are sensitive to territorial disputes, the 
third section uses the analytical framework to highlight any variations in 
expressions of nationalism that take place from one dispute to another. 
Here, typologies of nationalism according to each of the four territorial 
disputes will be identified. 
Theoretical Background  
In order to understand what causes variations in expressions of national-
ism in autocracies, we examine the cases of China and Vietnam and build 
an analytical framework of different expressions of nationalism in autoc-
racies. Womack (2006) conducted a valuable analysis of Sino-Vietnamese 
relations and also provided useful tools for the examination of China and 
Vietnam in a comparative context, which serve as a basis for construct-
ing a framework for the analysis of expressions of nationalism. Structural 
similarities between China and Vietnam can be divided into three strands: 
societal institutions, regime type and historical consciousness. 
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China and Vietnam share similar societal institutions, stemming 
from their common traditional heritage. China’s almost continuous dom-
ination of Vietnam (111 BC–AD 938 and 1407–1427) resulted in Viet-
namese civilisation becoming heavily sinicised (Womack 2006: 11–12). 
Progressive and radical movements with similar targets, ideologies and 
methods emerged in both countries in the 20th century. China has served 
as the most important reference for Vietnamese politics, particularly 
when it comes to revolution and reform. As such, both nations also took 
similar actions towards opening their economies to the rest of the world 
after decades of isolationism under radical communist regimes. This 
enabled China and Vietnam to join in with the age of globalisation and 
become major players (Womack 2006: 11–12). As a result of their long-
standing similarity in societal institutions, they currently have similar 
regime types. Consistent with their selection as case studies for explain-
ing expressions of nationalism in autocracies, both China and Vietnam 
possess autocratic regimes. All branches of power are concentrated with-
in the hands of their respective communist party leaders, Xi Jinping in 
Beijing and Nguyen Phu Trong in Hanoi. The Communist Party of Chi-
na (CPC) and the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) face no opposi-
tion and there are no democratic elections (The Economist 2016; China 
Internet Information Center n.d.; Puah 2016; Viet Nam Government 
Portal 2016).  
Finally, whether at government or popular levels, China and Vi-
etnam possess a nationalist discourse with a strongly embedded historical 
narrative. China has a strong narrative of pride for its ancient civilisation, 
imperial greatness and Confucian ideology (see Pye 1999: 35; Gries 2004: 
8; Wang 2008: 803). The celebration of Chinese historical greatness is 
illustrated by the soaring number and popularity of TV series, such as 
Scarlet Heart (↕↕᛺ᗳ) or Kang Dynasty (ᓧ⟉⦻ᵍ), depicting the tales 
of wise emperors. Likewise, there is an overwhelming sense of pride 
when it comes to the ordeals the Vietnamese people have had to face 
throughout history. Indeed, Vietnam was able to maintain its inner bal-
ance while complying with oppression by mightier foes, be it China, 
France or the United States. Those who risked death to rescue the nation 
from domination are seen as national liberators and heroes (Tréglodé 
2001; Womack 2006: 62–64). However, in the midst of these images of 
pride, both Chinese and Vietnamese historical narratives are also subject 
to the trauma of war and foreign incursion. While China and Vietnam 
are fellow victims of Western imperialism, their victimisation narrative 
also stems from incursions by regional enemies. The Vietnamese have 
long suffered at the hands of their giant northern neighbour, China. As 
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for the Chinese, the memory of the horrific destruction and suffering 
caused by the Japanese army during its occupation of China (1931–1945) 
is still heavy (Callahan 2004; He 2007; Womack 2006: 25). Therefore, the 
historical narrative of Chinese and Vietnamese nationalist discourse can 
be separated into constantly interchanging victimisation narratives and 
pride narratives.  
Similarities in societal institutions, regime type and nature of nation-
alist discourse indicate that China and Vietnam are appropriate cases for 
comparison. Moreover, through discourse analysis, scholars have used 
these structural characteristics to explain expressions of nationalism in 
autocracies. Interest in the survival of the state’s societal institutions, 
namely the CPC and the CPV, has prompted Chinese and Vietnamese 
leaders to alleviate control on expressions of nationalist public opinion. 
In China, “[p]arty legitimacy now depends upon accommodating popular 
nationalist demands” (Gries 2004: 20). This view argues that variations in 
expressions of nationalism are explained by the need to ensure Party 
survival (see also Shirk 2007). Efforts towards the survival of the CPC 
have led expressions of nationalism to become more common and less 
controlled, which can cause them to vary to wider extremes. This con-
clusion can also be applied to Vietnam, where popular voices have been 
increasing significantly, both in number and confidence (Palatino 2015; 
Hoang, Huynh and Nguyen 2015). For example, expressions of national-
ism demanding that Hanoi stands up to “bullies” like China over territo-
rial disputes are contingent upon the survival of the CPV. 
Other scholars have paid less attention to societal institutions and 
focused more on regime type to explain how nationalism is expressed. 
Sun (2011), Reilly (2012) and Weiss (2013, 2014) examined how national-
ism is expressed in autocracies, where governments have the authority to 
control and intervene in expressions of public opinion. In particular, they 
asked what causes variations in expressions of nationalism by examining 
street protests. Such public expressions of nationalism are typically for-
bidden or nipped in the bud – organised interest groups can be threaten-
ing to the regime – but they are sometimes allowed to take place in order 
to serve diplomatic interests. Indeed, CPC and CPV leaders employ 
similar tactics of instrumentalising public nationalist protests. 
Historical narrative is ubiquitous in any study of Chinese or Viet-
namese nationalism. Historical consciousness forms an integral part of 
the construction of Chinese nationalism and stems from both top-down 
and bottom-up constructions. The combination of the CPC’s Patriotic 
Education Campaign and the public opinion of Chinese netizens creates 
an overwhelmingly strong historical narrative in Chinese nationalism 
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(Zhao 2004a: 8–9, 2004b: 66; Wang 2008: 803–804; Callahan 2009; Gries 
2004: 20). As in China, the historical narrative in Vietnamese nationalism 
is reinforced by both top-down and bottom-up constructions. National 
history taught to Vietnamese schoolchildren and university students 
“serves the purpose of justifying communist rule and the leading role of 
the CPV” (Salomon and Vu 2007: 345). Like in China, this results in a 
particularly strong historical consciousness in Vietnamese nationalism 
(Salomon and Vu 2007: 358).  
Therefore, expressions of nationalism in China and Vietnam are 
conditioned by allusions to history but also by their societal institutions 
and regime types. Before examining how the countries’ structural charac-
teristics will influence the analytical framework, it is necessary to intro-
duce China and Vietnam’s territorial disputes.  
China and Vietnam’s Territorial Disputes 
The Sino-Vietnamese territorial dispute in the South China Sea, or the 
East Sea as the Vietnamese call it, is concentrated around two archipela-
gos: the Paracel Islands (Xisha in Chinese and Hoang Sa in Vietnamese) 
and the Spratly Islands (Nansha in Chinese and Truong Sa in Vietnam-
ese). In 2009, China submitted a United Nations (UN) Note Verbale in 
response to the one jointly submitted by Vietnam and Malaysia protest-
ing China’s claims. China’s UN Note Verbale stated that it possesses “in-
disputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the 
adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereignty rights and jurisdiction over the 
relevant water as well as subsoil thereof” (UN 2009). Attached to the 
document is a map with a nine-dash line indicating China’s maritime 
claim in the South China Sea (see Figure 1 below). The map below clear-
ly shows that the maritime spaces claimed by China overlap with Vi-
etnam’s (and those of other Southeast Asian neighbours). 
China’s claims over maritime territory situated within its nine-dash-
line has allowed it to make assertive moves in the South China Sea, 
whether this involves the patrol of its Coast Guard in disputed waters or 
deep-water drilling operations. On 1 May 2014, the China National Off-
shore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) deployed a giant deep-water oil-
drilling rig, the Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981), into waters south of 
the Paracel Islands in order to conduct a series of tests (AFP 2014). This 
provoked strong criticism from Hanoi and violence against Chinese 
citizens in Vietnam. In January 2016, China again demonstrated its claim 
on the area by placing the HYSY 981 just outside the Gulf of Tonkin, 
maritime territory also claimed by Vietnam.  
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Figure 1. Map Attached to the 2009 United Nations Note Verbale from 
China 
 
 
Source:  UN 2009. 
China’s dispute with Japan in the East China Sea centres around a small 
group of inhabited islands that the Chinese call the Diaoyu and the Japa-
nese call the Senkaku. The tensions between the two nations was largely 
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precipitated by Tokyo’s purchase of three of the five main islands in 
September 2012, a move that was apparently made to prevent an ultra-
nationalist right wing Japanese politician from acquiring them. Beijing 
accused Tokyo of breaking a tacit agreement to shelve the territorial dis-
pute and began to send its coast guard to patrol the contested waters. A 
pattern of potentially dangerous interactions between Chinese and Japa-
nese air and naval vessels over the islands’ territorial air space and waters 
began to take form (Swaine 2013: 1). In December 2012, tensions nearly 
broke into armed conflict when the two countries’ aerial forces became 
embroiled (Smith 2013: 1–2). In November 2013, the Chinese govern-
ment announced the establishment of an Air Defence Identification 
Zone (ADIZ), which overlaps with the airspaces of South Korea, Tai-
wan and Japan (see Figure 2). In particular, China’s ADIZ includes the 
territorial airspace above the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, elevating its terri-
torial claims in the East China Sea to a higher level, so to speak, and 
prompting tensions between China and Japan to rise yet again (Swaine 
2014: 1).  
According to China’s Ministry of National Defence, the zone was 
demarcated in order to safeguard China’s sovereignty over the area and 
done in accordance with Chinese law and international practices (Xinhua 
2013b). After some stagnation of the tensions in the East China, the 
Japanese Coast Guard reported in late December 2015 that China had 
sent an armed vessel near disputed islands – a sharp reminder that ten-
sions remain high in the area (Tiezzi 2016). China entered the disputed 
waters again in January 2016, showing that it stands by its claim on the 
maritime territory surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.  
The territorial disputes of Vietnam examined in this study are those 
with Cambodia and China. Although Vietnam’s website for the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, as well as a 2009 article on Vietnam’s border disputes, 
classify the land border issue between Vietnam and Cambodia as settled, 
recent violence along the shared border argues otherwise. The Moc Bai – 
Ba Vet border issue should have been settled in 2006 following an 
agreement between the two nations’ prime ministers. The demarcation 
of the 1200 km long border was due to be completed in 2012, but 20 per 
cent of it remains unmarked (Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2009a; Amer and Thao 2009: 59; Tomiyama 2015). In recent years, ten-
sions on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border have begun to flare up again 
as anti-Vietnamese nationalism and a perceived Vietnamese threat begins 
to regain momentum.  
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Figure 2. China’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China 
Sea 
Source:  Xinhua 2013a. 
In 2009, Sam Rainsy, the leader of the opposition Cambodia National 
Rescue Party (CNRP), allegedly encouraged villagers to uproot border 
markers in Svay Rieng province, flaring up tensions and causing violent 
clashes between Vietnamese and Cambodian civilians (Chheang 2015). 
In June 2015, tensions culminated into violent clashes on the Vietnam-
ese-Cambodian border. This latest incident was precipitated by CNRP 
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lawmakers Real Camerin and Sam An, who led around 250 Cambodian 
activists armed with sticks into Vietnamese territory. They were met by 
Vietnamese security officers and local residents who tried to prevent 
them from trespassing. The altercation soon escalated into violent clash-
es between the two groups and dozens of Vietnamese and Cambodian 
nationals were injured (RFA 2015; Khmer Times 2015; Florcruz 2015; 
Chheang 2015). The map (Figure 3) below indicates the location of the 
border markers (X) and the actual borderline according to Sam Rainsy.  
Figure 3. The Cambodia-Vietnam Border According to Sam Rainsy 
 
Source:  Sokheounpang 2013. 
Thus, in the context of the present study, the land border dispute be-
tween Vietnam and Cambodia cannot be considered as resolved. 
Vietnam’s maritime territorial dispute with China in the South Chi-
na Sea has been ongoing since 1974, when Vietnam accused China of the 
opportunistic takeover of the Paracel Islands (Path 2011: 190). Because 
the onset of this dispute has already been analysed in the context of 
China’s territorial disputes, I will not go further into its developments. 
The four disputes presented above can be separated into three types. 
China’s dispute with Vietnam and Vietnam’s dispute with Cambodia are 
dispute type 1 – dispute with a traditionally weaker rival. China’s dispute 
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with Japan is dispute type 2 – dispute with a rival whose relative strength 
has varied throughout history. Vietnam’s dispute with China is dispute 
type 3 – dispute with a traditionally stronger rival. If expressions of na-
tionalism in China and Vietnam are sensitive to the dispute in question, 
then this suggests that dispute type could also be a conditioning factor of 
nationalism in autocracies. However, in order to examine whether this is 
the case, it is necessary to become acquainted with the second variable, 
which is the criteria for expressions of nationalism in autocracies such as 
China and Vietnam. 
Presentation of the Analytical Framework 
The analytical framework consists of three criteria – A, B and C – based 
on the structural characteristic of China and Vietnam examined above. 
The nature of Chinese and Vietnamese societal institutions and regime 
type has meant that expressions of nationalism, even as far as public 
protests, are permitted at popular levels and are maintained at govern-
mental levels. Therefore, I make a distinction here between different 
levels of discourse – official (government level) and non-official (popular 
level) – in order to examine expressions of nationalism. The method of 
discourse analysis will be used to examine expressions of nationalism in 
China and Vietnam.  
Moreover, the various interchanging narratives of historical con-
sciousness will be highlighted throughout the analytical framework. As 
such, the first set of criteria, Criteria A, examines the discourse surround-
ing the territorial dispute in question from an ‘official’ perspective to 
understand the typology of nationalism for each dispute. The nature of 
official discourse on the dispute will be determined according to two 
elements: (1) the presence (or absence) of a fervent discourse surround-
ing the dispute and (2) whether the discourse contains references to 
history. The first element for determining the nature of official discourse 
surrounding a territorial dispute is whether or not there is one. Has there 
been an official statement concerning the territorial dispute from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs? Has a spokesperson from the government 
disclosed any information on a recent development in the contested area? 
Has official state media made any reports on current events regarding 
the territorial dispute? If so, can this discourse be described as ‘fervent’? 
In other words, does it convey a sense of importance? Does the state-
ment, comment or article appear keen and committed to the territorial 
dispute? If the answer to these questions are yes, then two further sub-
elements ensue; whether there is an anti-foreign narrative in the dis-
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course, and whether it involves violence. These two sub-elements will 
help determine the extent to which the official discourse on the dispute 
is fervent.  
The second element that will determine the nature of official dis-
course on the dispute is whether it contains references to history. Do 
statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, government spokesper-
sons or state media make any historical references, whether they directly 
concern the rival state or not? Indeed, references to history in official 
discourse range from a general tribute to the state’s own history, to rec-
ollections of the shared history between said state and its rival, whether 
they are periods of enmity or amity. If the official discourse on the dis-
pute contains references to history, then two sub-elements ensue: the 
presence (or absence) of a victimisation narrative followed by the pres-
ence (or absence) of a pride narrative. The presence (or absence) of a 
fervent discourse and the references (or not) to history, along with their 
respective sub-elements, will draw a clear picture of the nature of official 
discourse concerning the territorial dispute in question.  
The second set of criteria, labelled Criteria B, examines the dis-
course surrounding territorial disputes from a ‘non-official’ perspective. 
The material examined here is sourced in large part from social media 
and online forums. The focus on expressions of nationalism from Chi-
nese and Vietnamese citizens who use the internet to assert their public 
opinion – otherwise known as ‘netizens’ – is motivated by the recent 
skyrocketing number of internet users. The number of internet users has 
increased nearly five-fold in China and three-fold in Vietnam (Internet 
Live Stats 2016). Sun found that “[t]he opinions of Chinese netizens are 
often identified by observers, including some serious researchers, as a 
key indicator of Chinese public opinion on foreign policies” (2011). The 
same can be said of Vietnamese netizens, whose public opinions are 
“getting bolder online” (Palatino 2015; see also RFA 2014), providing an 
accurate representation of the public’s views on both domestic and for-
eign affairs for researchers to analyse. Like Criteria A, Criteria B are 
determined by two elements: (1) the presence (or absence) of a fervent 
discourse surrounding the dispute and (2) whether the discourse contains 
references to history. Criteria B also contains the same sub-elements as 
put forward in Criteria A.  
Criteria C completes the analytical framework by examining expres-
sions of nationalism at their apogee, where nationalist sentiments from 
the public are expressed physically, despite the risks it entails in states 
where protests are typically forbidden. Consistent with the above sets of 
criteria, Criteria C looks at the context in which public protests take 
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place and asks whether the nature of the protests is sensitive to the dis-
pute in question. Accordingly, a number of elements are necessary in 
order to determine the nature of protests concerning the territorial dis-
pute. The first is the presence (or absence) of protests relating to the 
dispute at hand. Because public protests are typically forbidden in autoc-
racies like China and Vietnam, it is practically impossible to know 
whether a protest did not take place because it was nipped in the bud or 
because the public did not find the motivation to actually stage one. 
Nonetheless, if there are such public manifestations relating to the terri-
torial dispute in question, then the next step is to determine whether 
there is an anti-foreign narrative and whether the discourse involves 
elements of violence. This will help determine the nature of the public 
protests concerning the dispute, if there are any at all.  
The nature of these public protests will be further determined by 
whether or not banners, slogans or any actions by protesters make any 
references to history. Here, the emotional intonations are clearly more 
emphasised than in Criteria B and C. Symbolism is rife and passions 
grow stronger as group mentality push protesters to act even more ve-
hemently than they would otherwise do.  
The three sets of criteria against which each of the four disputes will 
be examined can be summarised using the following table. 
Table 1. The Analytical Framework 
CRITERIA A NATURE OF OFFICIAL DISCOURSE 
ON THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF A FERVENT DISCOURSE YES/NO 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative  
Involvement of violence   
REFERENCES TO HISTORY YES/NO 
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative  
 
CRITERIA B NATURE OF NON-OFFICIAL DIS-
COURSE ON THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF A FERVENT DISCOURSE YES/NO 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative  
Involvement of violence   
REFERENCES TO HISTORY YES/NO 
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative  
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CRITERIA C NATURE OF PROTESTS CONCERN-
ING THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF PROTESTS YES/NO 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative  
Involvement of violence   
REFERENCES TO HISTORY YES/NO 
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative  
Note:  Should any of the elements of Criteria A, B or C become apparent in the 
discourse (a ‘YES’ answer), then the sub-elements that they possess will be 
marked with an ‘X’. Thus, the presence of a pride narrative, for example, is 
contingent on there being references to history in the discourse. Moreover, 
should the territorial dispute not generate any protests (a ‘NO’ answer to 
‘PRESENCE OF PROTESTS’), the entirety of Criteria C will be greyed out.  
Whether expressions of nationalism in China and Vietnam are sensitive 
to the dispute in question – indicating that context is indeed a condition-
ing factor of nationalism – will be examined through the analysis of terri-
torial disputes against the criteria detailed above.  
Typologies of Nationalism According to  
Territorial Dispute 
In order to determine whether nationalism in China and Vietnam is 
sensitive to different disputes by highlighting variations in expressions of 
nationalism, China’s maritime territorial dispute with Vietnam, China’s 
maritime territorial dispute with Japan, Vietnam’s territorial border dis-
pute with Cambodia, and Vietnam’s maritime territorial dispute with 
China will be examined against Criteria A, B and C. 
The first dispute, China’s dispute with Vietnam over maritime terri-
tory in the South China Sea, is a ‘dispute type 1’; that is, a dispute with a 
traditionally weaker rival. China has issued a number of official state-
ments, documents, speeches and written reports of press conferences 
concerning its claims in the South China Sea. In response to Vietnamese 
denunciations of China for deploying a giant oil rig, HYSY 981, into 
waters south of the Paracel Islands, China’s Foreign Ministry vehemently 
defended CNOOC’s rights to undertake work around the Paracel Islands 
and condemned interference by Vietnamese patrol vessels (China’s Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs 2014a, 2014b). Moreover, Chinese state media 
has widely broadcast details of the May 2014 violence that took place 
against Chinese nationals in Vietnam. The discourse put forward by 
China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears keen and committed to its 
stance on the maritime territorial dispute with Vietnam. As expected, the 
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discourse discernable in state media is well in line with that of statements 
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It can therefore be deduced that 
the official discourse on the maritime territorial dispute with Vietnam is 
a fervent one. The question now arises as to whether it contains an anti-
foreign narrative and whether it involves threats of violence. No offen-
sive generalisations against Vietnam have been made in any sources of 
official discourse. The interviews of Chinese nationals only express their 
relief to have escaped the violence and make no comments suggesting 
hatred against Vietnamese people. It is harder to discern whether official 
discourse involves threats of violence, amid statements that China will 
take “all necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and mari-
time rights and interests” (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014a). 
However, China’s assertions do not explicitly threaten Vietnam with 
military intervention. It appears that China is merely prodding Vietnam 
to remind it of its claim, rather than using military force to coerce it into 
accepting China’s sovereignty over the disputed area. There have been 
very few historical references in official discourse pertaining to China’s 
dispute with Vietnam over territory in the South China Sea. Those that 
have been made are not significant enough for this analysis to argue that 
the official discourse pertaining to China’s dispute with Vietnam in the 
South China Sea contains historical references.  
Because maritime territorial disputes in the South and East China 
Seas hold Chinese people to heart (Chubb 2014), this topic has been 
heavily discussed on social media platforms and online forums. On Sina 
Weibo, for example, anger and anxiety was expressed over the May 2014 
anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam. Emotions also ran high on the People’s 
Daily’s “Strong Nation Forum” (SNF). Many posts manifested their 
confusion about the situation, with variations on the question “What on 
earth are the Vietnamese doing?” appearing in many posts on the forum. 
The discourse present in non-official sources is unanimously in favour of 
maintaining China’s stance on the dispute and conveys a sense of im-
portance to the issue. Moreover, unlike official discourse on the dispute, 
there is a strong anti-Vietnamese narrative on social media platforms and 
online forums. Many users on Sina Weibo applied the racial epithet of 公
ᆀ guizi, which means “devil”, to refer to people of Vietnamese nationali-
ty (ChinaFile 2014). The SNF also shows uses of the term “devil” to 
describe Vietnamese people, with one post contending that “China 
should seize and punish the foreign devils who unlawfully infringe on or 
undermine China’s sovereignty over maritime territory”. As well as con-
taining an anti-foreign narrative, non-official discourse involves a con-
siderable amount of violence. The vocabulary used in posts on Sina 
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Weibo and the SNF is particularly aggressive and repeatedly calls for more 
assertiveness on behalf of China’s leaders (ChinaFile 2014; Freeweibo 2014). 
As for references to history, they are ubiquitous in non-official discourse. 
Sina Weibo users often invoke the Sino–Vietnamese war of 1979 in their 
calls for China to go to war with Vietnam over its repeated dismissal of 
Chinese sovereignty on the Paracel and Spratly Islands and the violence 
committed against Chinese nationals in May 2014 (ChinaFile 2014). Posts 
on the SNF call for Vietnam to remember its war against the US. As well 
as “China’s military sacrifice for Vietnam”, Vietnam as a “vassal state” 
and Vietnam’s military inferiority to China are other topics frequently 
cited in non-official discourse. There is a sense of pride in these histori-
cal references. China sees itself as morally superior to Vietnam. Aside 
from accusations that the Vietnamese are ungrateful to China for its 
services during the Vietnam War, there is no victimisation narrative dis-
cernable in the discourse.  
Despite fervent official and non-official discourse pertaining the 
dispute with Vietnam over maritime territory in the South China Sea, 
there have been no street protests in China over the issue. It is not pos-
sible to tell whether they have been nipped in the bud by the Chinese 
state or whether there was simply not enough public outrage to stage a 
protest. What can be said with certainty is that this type of dispute did 
not generate an escalation of expressions of nationalism to that level of 
intensity. Should non-official sources of nationalism have wanted to 
escalate their expressions of nationalism for this dispute to that intensity, 
this would mean that such a desire was not met at the official level.  
Table 2 summarises the testing of the May 2014 escalation of Chi-
na’s dispute with Vietnam over maritime territory in the South China Sea 
– a territorial dispute with a traditionally weaker rival – against Criteria A, 
B and C.  
The second dispute, China’s Dispute with Japan over maritime terri-
tory in the East China Sea, is a type-2 dispute; that is, a dispute with a 
rival whose relative strength has varied throughout history. Chubb’s 
assessment of China’s maritime consciousness noted that more attention 
was given to the dispute with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
than to the dispute in the South China Sea (Chubb 2014: 9–10). Indeed, 
an examination of the official discourse on the matter suggests that this 
may well be the case. Official statements, documents, speeches and writ-
ten reports of press conferences concerning China’s claims in the East 
China Sea are particularly numerous and wide-ranging. 
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Table 2. The Typology of Nationalism According to China’s Dispute with 
Vietnam 
CRITERIA A NATURE OF OFFICIAL DISCOURSE ON 
THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF A FERVENT DISCOURSE YES 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative  
Involvement of violence   
REFERENCES TO HISTORY NO 
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative  
 
CRITERIA B NATURE OF NON-OFFICIAL DISCOURSE 
ON THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF A FERVENT DISCOURSE YES 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative X 
Involvement of violence  X 
REFERENCES TO HISTORY YES 
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative X 
 
CRITERIA C NATURE OF PROTESTS CONCERNING 
THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF PROTESTS NO 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative  
Involvement of violence   
REFERENCES TO HISTORY  
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative  
Note: Dispute type 1 – dispute with a traditionally weaker rival. 
In September 2012, when tensions between the two nations were precip-
itated by Tokyo’s purchase of three of the five main islands, China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to condemn the move (China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a, 2012b). Chinese state media has sys-
tematically reported on government statements as events and escalations 
in the East China Sea have unfolded throughout the years (Xinhua 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c). All of the reports from Xinhua and People’s Daily on the 
matter elaborate extensively on the unlawful act committed by Japan in 
nationalising the islands. Therefore, official discourse on this dispute is 
clearly fervent. However, as was the case for the dispute with Vietnam 
over maritime territory in the South China Sea, official discourse avoids 
any strong narratives with xenophobic connotations, although it does 
involve elements of violence. Close examination of official discourse 
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reveals a sense of readiness to intervene militarily if required (whether 
Beijing would actually do so is another question). In particular, the fact 
that China has bolstered its right to send an armed vessel into disputed 
waters (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015) underlines the violent 
elements in official discourse pertaining to the dispute. With regard to 
the second element that will help assess the nature of official discourse 
on the dispute, there are strong references to history throughout. One 
statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs protests Japan’s under-
mining of China’s sovereignty over the islands:  
Long gone are the days when the Chinese nation was subject to 
bullying and humiliation from others. The Chinese government 
will not sit idly by watching its territorial sovereignty being in-
fringed upon. (China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012b) 
State media also makes clear references to history in many of its articles 
concerning the current dispute with Japan (see Xinhua 2012a). Refer-
ences to history in official discourse contain both a victimisation narra-
tive and a pride narrative. At first glance, the pride narrative is hard to 
discern amongst the overwhelming references to Japan’s invasion of 
China, the “September 18 Incident” and the humiliation of the Chinese 
people. However, in stating that China will no longer accept such treat-
ment by the Japanese, Chinese leaders wish to announce it is time to turn 
the page on years of humiliation at the hands of foreign imperialism and 
retrieve its deserved status on the world stage. China wishes to regain the 
respect that it once had in the eyes of its Asian neighbours.  
Given the nature of official discourse, it is unsurprising that social 
media and online forums concerning the issue are particularly fervent. 
The majority of posts on Sina Weibo carry a strong adversarial sentiment 
towards Japan’s actions in the disputed maritime territory. On the People’s 
Daily’s SNF, a simple search for the key word “Diaoyu Dao” results in 
1741 pages containing various posts and threads on the matter. Accord-
ingly, the non-official discourse pertaining to this dispute contains all the 
elements of Criteria B; a fervent discourse with the presence of an anti-
foreign narrative and the involvement of violence, as well as references 
to history with both the victimisation and pride narratives are strong 
characteristics of non-official nationalism about the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Island dispute. Indeed, the term 公ᆀ guizi (“devil”) to describe the Jap-
anese was widely used on Sina Weibo and the SNF. There were calls for 
China to be increasingly assertive in order to tackle the situation, thus 
suggesting that the non-official discourse involves elements of violence. 
As for references to history, the trauma of Japan’s actions during its 
  Territorial Disputes and Nationalism 69
 

 
imperial years is clear throughout the non-official discourse. One user on 
the SNF, called Bao Dao Yao Li Zhi, painted China as having the moral 
high ground as a “victim” of aggression by outside powers. A narrative 
of pride is also discernable in the discourse: Chinese netizens are cele-
brating China rising once again to Great Power status. One post on Sina 
Weibo represents this superimposition of victimisation and pride narra-
tives: 
Today in history: on August 15, 1945, Japan announced to the 
world its unconditional surrender. On this memorable day, we 
should remind our future generations to remember the horren-
dous crimes Japan committed to Chinese people. Now our moth-
erland is rising. We would never again allow Japan to play gang-
sters on our territory. Let’s fight against imperialist invasion, de-
fend our sovereignty, and protect world peace! 
This post refers simultaneously to China’s victory in the Second World 
War, China’s suffering at the hands of the “Japanese imperialists” and 
China’s return to Great Power status after a century of humiliation.  
Expressions of nationalism in China about the territorial dispute in 
the East China Seas culminated in September 2012 when Tokyo moved 
to purchase three of the five main Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. In dozens of 
Chinese cities, crowds of young Chinese protesters gathered to express 
their disdain for Japan and the Japanese. The presence of an anti-foreign 
narrative here is evident from pictures of the demonstrations. Thousands 
of protesters across China’s major cities were pictured draped in the 
Chinese flag, brandishing portraits of Chairman Mao, exclaiming that the 
“Diaoyu Islands belong to China” and calling on the Japanese to “get 
out” (People’s Daily 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). Japanese flags were burned and 
pictures of Japanese leaders were vandalised (Wee and Duncan 2012; 
Spegele and Nakamichi 2012; The Economist 2012). As in the Criteria B, 
expressions of nationalism about China’s maritime territorial dispute 
with Japan, used the term 公ᆀ guizi: “Return our islands! Japanese devils 
get out!” (Wee and Duncan 2012). As for the involvement of violence, it 
is evident from the degree of the anti-foreign narrative depicted above 
that the protests were violent in nature. The anti-Japanese demonstra-
tions of late summer 2012 escalated from orderly to completely out of 
hand, with Japanese business vandalised and set alight (Xinhua 2012d; 
Johnson and Shanker 2012). On 15 September 2012, a Toyota Corolla 
owner in Xi’An was severely beaten up because he was driving a Japa-
nese car (Zhang 2014: 92; Huang 2012). Given that the rival in question 
was a prime war-time enemy of China, it is not surprising that references 
to history were invoked during the anti-Japanese protests. Protesters 
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shouted slogans such as “down with Japanese imperialism” (Jiang 2012). 
In a series of photos published by Reuters (Blanchard and Slodkowski 
2012), a victimisation narrative and a pride narrative are both observable 
in the protests. In Guangzhou, on the anniversary of the Japanese occu-
pation of Manchuria, a protester is photographed burning a Japanese flag 
in front of a banner with photos of the Sino-Japanese War. Combined 
with other photos showing protesters brandishing banners and placards 
of Chairman Mao and the Chinese flag, Chinese protesters seem to be 
showing that further aggression from Japan will no longer be tolerated 
now that China is strong again. 
China’s dispute with Japan over maritime territory in the East China 
Sea – a dispute with a rival whose relative strength has varied throughout 
history – carries a strong discourse at both the official and non-official 
levels. The fact that protests were allowed to take place suggests a tacit 
agreement by the Chinese state that expressions of nationalism deserved 
to be escalated to this degree. Table 3 summarises the flare-up of ten-
sions with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands late in the summer of 
2012 against Criteria A, B and C.  
The third dispute that this paper examines, Vietnam’s Dispute with 
Cambodia over territorial border demarcations, is a type-1 dispute; that is, 
a dispute with a traditionally weaker rival. Because the border dispute 
with Cambodia flared up due to actions not condoned by the Cambodi-
an government, Vietnam does not generally issue a large number of 
official statements and documents on the dispute when tensions escalate. 
However, Hanoi has been particularly critical of CNRP leader Sam Rain-
sy’s provocative actions along the border. When Rainsy went to the 
border area between Long An Province in Vietnam and Svay Rieng 
Province in Cambodia in 2009 to uproot border poles, the Vietnamese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to condemn his actions (Vietnam’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009b). When violent clashes led by mem-
bers of the CNRP took place on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border in 
June 2015, Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly criticised the 
violence. It stated that the perpetrators “violated both Vietnam and 
Cambodia’s laws, as well as treaties and agreements signed by both sides” 
(Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). State-controlled media 
outlets have also published articles about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
condemnation of Cambodian politicians taking issue with the border 
demarcation (Tuoi Tre News 2015a, 2015b). Vietnamese official discourse 
pertaining to the territorial border dispute with Cambodia can be de-
scribed as fervent only to the extent that actions by “Cambodian extrem-
ists” have been strongly condemned. Accordingly, a thorough analysis of 
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statements and documents published by the Vietnamese government and 
state media reveals no anti-Cambodian narrative nor threats to use vio-
lence. Moreover, there are almost no historical references to the at times 
tumultuous relationship between Vietnam and Cambodia, nor are there 
any concerning Vietnam’s own history. Thus, the official discourse per-
taining to Vietnam’s territorial border dispute with Cambodia and, more 
specifically, the violent clashes of June 2015 in border regions, is limited 
to a handful of official statements and documents containing a fervent 
discourse.  
Table 3. The Typology of Nationalism According to China’s Dispute with 
Japan 
CRITERIA A NATURE OF OFFICIAL DISCOURSE ON 
THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF A FERVENT DISCOURSE YES 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative  
Involvement of violence  X 
REFERENCES TO HISTORY YES 
Victimisation narrative X 
Pride narrative X 
 
CRITERIA B NATURE OF NON-OFFICIAL DISCOURSE 
ON THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF A FERVENT DISCOURSE YES 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative X 
Involvement of violence  X 
REFERENCES TO HISTORY YES 
Victimisation narrative X 
Pride narrative X 
 
CRITERIA C NATURE OF PROTESTS CONCERNING 
THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF PROTESTS YES 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative X 
Involvement of violence  X 
REFERENCES TO HISTORY YES 
Victimisation narrative X 
Pride narrative X 
Note:  Dispute type 2 – dispute with a rival whose relative strength has varied 
throughout history. 
As seen in the case of China’s dispute with Vietnam in the South China 
Sea, it is possible that non-official discourse pertaining to Vietnam’s ter-
ritorial border dispute with Cambodia is unrestrained in comparison to 
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the official discourse. Vietnam’s dispute with Cambodia over territorial 
border demarcation has been discussed at length on social media and 
online forums. Vietnam’s most popular social media platform, Facebook, 
contains many references to the territorial border dispute with Cambodia, 
especially around the time of the June 2015 clashes. Through comments, 
shares and “likes”, Vietnamese Facebook users express both their love for 
their country and their anger at Cambodian politicians complicating the 
demarcation process along the shared border. First and foremost, posts 
about the dispute on the official Facebook pages of Thanh Nien News and 
Tuoi Tre News have been shared and “liked” hundreds of times. Reports 
on Cambodia’s accusations of Vietnam and violent clashes on the border 
led by “Cambodian extremists” have attracted many comments and 
discussion threads by Facebook users. Secondly, prominent Facebook users 
such as Le Nguyen Hung Tra, who has 314,591 followers, have also 
participated in posting and sharing material concerning the dispute. For 
example, on 19 July 2015, Hung Tra added 20 photos of the June 2015 
incident, attracting nearly 10,000 “likes” and thousands of comments. 
Finally, the comment sections of articles published on the official web-
sites of Thanh Nien News and Tuoi Tre News have attracted the opinions of 
a number of Vietnam netizens (Thanh Nien News 2015; Tuoi Tre Online 
2015). The considerable amount of attention that Vietnamese netizens 
have given to non-official sources of discourse on the dispute shows that 
the discourse is fervent. That said, an analysis of these four sources of 
discourse about Vietnam’s territorial border dispute with Cambodia 
shows no signs of an anti-Cambodian narrative or calls for the Vietnam-
ese government to use violent measures in order to tackle the tense situa-
tion.  
However, references to history are particularly frequent in comment 
sections of Facebook posts and articles from official news websites cover-
ing the June 2015 incident on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border. A 
recurring theme emerges when scanning through the long list of com-
ments on the pictures: Vietnamese netizens are accusing Cambodians of 
being ungrateful for the role the Vietnamese played in ending Pol Pot’s 
regime. A further examination of the non-official discourse pertaining to 
Vietnam’s dispute with Cambodia over the border demarcation reveals a 
narrative of pride. Vietnamese netizens remind Cambodians of their 
benevolence towards the Cambodian people when they were suffering at 
the hands of Pol Pot, and the sacrifice Vietnamese soldiers made in or-
der to save non-Vietnamese citizens. This period of Vietnam’s history 
remains very vivid in the memories of Vietnamese netizens. Their disap-
pointment with Cambodian “extremists” conveys a sense of superiority 
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in morality of the Vietnamese people. All historical references in the 
non-official discourse are of Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia and 
there is no victimisation narrative discernable. Therefore, netizens are 
extremely proud of their “liberation” mission in Cambodia of the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  
Despite fervent official and non-official discourse pertaining to the 
dispute with Cambodia over border demarcations, there have been no 
public protests in Vietnam over the issue. As with the Chinese case and 
its maritime territorial dispute with Vietnam, it is impossible to tell 
whether the absence of protests is due to the government nipping them 
in the bud or because Vietnamese citizens did not reach that level of 
outrage against “Cambodian extremists”. If non-official sources of na-
tionalism wanted to escalate their expressions of nationalism for this 
dispute to that intensity, this means that such a desire was not reflected 
at the official level.  
Table 4 summarises the testing of Vietnam’s dispute with Cambodia 
over border demarcations – a territorial dispute with a traditionally 
weaker rival – against Criteria A, B and C.  
The fourth dispute examined in this study is a type-3 dispute; that is, 
a dispute with a traditionally stronger rival. From Vietnam’s standpoint, 
China’s claims in the South China Sea are the latest in a series of aggres-
sive acts by the overwhelmingly stronger neighbour. However, Vietnam’s 
leaders and its people have stood strong against Chinese assertiveness. In 
May 2014, when CNOOC deployed the giant oil rig HYSY 981 into 
waters claimed by Vietnam, Hanoi issued a number of official statements, 
documents, speeches and written reports of press conferences to de-
nounce Beijing’s usurpation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that 
“China’s activities, in violation of international law, escalate tension in 
the East Sea” (Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014a, 2014b). 
 
Table 4. The Typology of Nationalism According to Vietnam’s Dispute with 
Cambodia 
CRITERIA A NATURE OF OFFICIAL DISCOURSE ON 
THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF A FERVENT DISCOURSE YES 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative  
Involvement of violence   
REFERENCES TO HISTORY NO 
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative  
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CRITERIA B NATURE OF NON-OFFICIAL DISCOURSE 
ON THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF A FERVENT DISCOURSE YES 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative  
Involvement of violence   
REFERENCES TO HISTORY YES 
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative X 
 
CRITERIA C NATURE OF PROTESTS CONCERNING 
THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF PROTESTS NO 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative  
Involvement of violence   
REFERENCES TO HISTORY  
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative  
Note:  Dispute type 1 – dispute with a traditionally weaker rival. 
Vietnam also took China to the UN over its sovereignty claims in the 
South China Sea. On 3 July 2014, Hanoi sent a paper to UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon “opposing China’s illegal occupation of the Ho-
ang Sa (Paracel) archipelago and asserting Vietnam’s sovereignty over it” 
(Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014c, 2014d, 2014e). China’s 
May 2014 activities around the Paracel Islands were also extensively 
covered by Vietnamese official state media. Thanh Nien News and Tuoi Tre 
News reported on statements and press conferences issued by the Viet-
namese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tuoi Tre News 2014a, 2014b; Thanh 
Nien News 2014a, 2014b, 2014c). They also reported on Vietnam elevat-
ing the dispute to the UN (Tuoi Tre News 2014c, 2014d; Thanh Nien News 
2014d, 2014e, 2014f).  
The number of official statements and state media reports concern-
ing China’s placement of HYSY 981 in waters claimed by Vietnam – let 
alone the number of statements concerning the dispute in general – 
clearly shows the importance that Vietnam attaches to this dispute. Viet-
namese official discourse appears keen and committed to the dispute 
with China over maritime territory in the South China Sea; therefore, the 
discourse is fervent. If the official discourse is fervent, then does it put 
forward an anti-foreign narrative and does it involve violence? As was 
the case for the dispute with Cambodia over territorial border demarca-
tions, Vietnamese official discourse avoids any strong narratives with 
xenophobic intonations. Regarding the involvement of violence, an 
overwhelming majority of the official discourse stresses the need to settle 
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the dispute with China peacefully (Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2014f, 2015d, 2014g). Vietnam has indeed turned to the international 
community, and to the UN more specifically, for support in resolving 
the dispute. Therefore, it cannot be argued that Hanoi has shown readi-
ness to intervene militarily over the maritime territorial dispute with 
China in the South China Sea. As for references to history, from Vi-
etnam’s perspective, its relationship with China is laden with historical 
baggage. However, aside from the use of historical evidence to prove 
Vietnam’s sovereignty over the disputed maritime territory (Vietnam’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014h), there are no historical references in 
the discourse.  
Considering the historical relationship of China and Vietnam, it is 
not surprising that non-official discourse pertaining to Vietnam’s mari-
time territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea is particularly 
fervent. Indeed, the Vietnamese tend to express their nationalism on 
social media and online forums loudly and clearly. Hence, a simple Face-
book search, in Vietnamese, for the key words “China” and “Paracel 
Islands” produces a long list of results, especially around the time of the 
May 2014 escalation of the dispute. Vietnamese netizens commented, 
shared and “liked” thousands of Facebook posts about China’s placement 
of HYSY in 981 in Vietnamese waters. As was the case with the exami-
nation of non-official discourse about Vietnam’s dispute with Cambodia, 
the non-official discourse pertaining to Vietnam’s maritime territorial 
dispute with China can be separated into several types of sources. First, 
many of the articles from Thanh Nien News and Tuoi Tre News have been 
posted on the media outlets’ Facebook pages. These attracted a lot of 
attention from Facebook users and were widely shared online, especially 
around May 2014 when China placed HYSY 981 into waters near the 
Paracel Islands. Secondly, there are Facebook communities dedicated to 
the dispute, such as “Truong Sa – Hoang Sa la cua Viet Nam” (“Spratly 
– Paracel Islands belong to Vietnam”), which has over 88,000 “likes”, 
and “Truong Sa va Hoang Sa la cua Viet Nam!!! Do la su that khong the 
choi cai” (“Spratly and Paracel Islands belong to Vietnam!!! It is the 
indisputable truth”), which has over 19,000 “likes”. These Facebook pages 
share various articles and posts on China’s activities in the South China 
Sea for its community of netizens to see and comment on. Finally, the 
comment sections of articles published on the official websites Thanh 
Nien News have attracted the opinions of a number of Vietnam netizens 
(Thanh Nien News 2014g, 2014h). Therefore, it is clear that Vietnamese 
non-official discourse pertaining to Vietnam’s dispute with China over 
maritime territory in the South China Sea is fervent. Moreover, the anti-
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China narrative on Facebook is striking. Chinese companies and products 
have also been strongly criticised on Facebook groups and pages. China 
has been compared to the Nazis or ISIS, and many posts warn netizens 
about anything “Made in China”. The discourse also involves elements 
of violence as Vietnamese netizens call on Hanoi to unite with other 
Southeast Asian nations being bullied by China and resist its aggression 
through force. While there is no outright call for war with China, many 
commentators have explicitly demanded that the Vietnamese govern-
ment stand up to China using military might. The non-official discourse 
pertaining to Vietnam’s dispute with China over maritime territory in the 
South China Sea also contains references to history. On “Bien Dong” 
(“East Sea”), a public Facebook group dedicated to Vietnam’s sovereignty 
claims in the South China Sea, there is a video compilation of images 
showing Vietnam at war and Vietnamese soldiers going to fight. The fact 
that the video begins with a propaganda poster of Vietnam making a fist 
at a greedy and savage-looking China shows that it is a reference to his-
tory with a narrative of pride. One user, Doan Quang Minh, said that 
throughout its history, Vietnam has always been embroiled in conflict 
against a mightier foe: France and the US, against whom it emerged the 
victor, and now China. That said, a victimisation narrative is also dis-
cernable in the non-official discourse. Many netizens on Facebook argue 
that the Vietnamese have been through enough and that they have 
fought long and hard for their nation. Other comments say that after 
years of war and suffering, Vietnamese people now want to live in peace 
and cooperate. Thus, a narrative of pride is superimposed with a narra-
tive of victimisation. 
There have also been protests surrounding Vietnam’s dispute with 
China. Non-official expressions of nationalism about Vietnam’s maritime 
territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea began to build up in 
intensity when peaceful anti-China protests were organised by Vietnam-
ese netizens, mainly on Facebook (You and Paddock 2014). Thus, on 11 
May 2014, tens of thousands of Vietnamese people took to the streets in 
Hanoi, Hue City, Da Nang City, and Ho Chi Minh City to protest Chi-
na’s placement of HYSY 981 in waters claimed by Vietnam. The over-
arching theme during these protests was clearly the anti-foreign narrative. 
Protesters branded banners and placards telling China to “back off”. 
Chinese people were portrayed as invaders and even pirates as protesters 
branded Chinese flags with pictures of pirate skulls (South China Morning 
Post 2014; Ives and Fuller 2014; Asian Correspondent 2014; BBC 2014). The 
initially peaceful anti-China movement began to escalate when Vietnam-
ese protesters turned to supposedly Chinese-owned businesses and fac-
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tories to show their displeasure. On 12 May, anti-China protests began to 
escalate at South Vietnam’s large industrial parks. A Taiwanese-owned 
shoe factory was burned down and a Chinese worker was killed. These 
riots in southern Vietnam hit hundreds of foreign-owned companies. 
Vietnamese protesters beat, smashed, looted and burned anything that 
was allegedly Chinese-owned. Explicit expressions of hatred towards 
Chinese people continued to escalate when riots at a Taiwanese steel 
plant site killed more victims (You and Paddock 2014). Over 20 Chinese 
were killed during these riots before the Vietnamese authorities inter-
vened (Reuters 2014). The protests in Vietnam following China’s place-
ment of the HYSY 981 oil rig in disputed waters were violent at the 
utmost degree.  
Table 5. The Typology of Nationalism According to Vietnam’s Dispute with 
China 
CRITERIA A NATURE OF OFFICIAL DISCOURSE ON 
THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF A FERVENT DISCOURSE YES 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative  
Involvement of violence   
REFERENCES TO HISTORY NO 
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative  
 
CRITERIA B NATURE OF NON-OFFICIAL DISCOURSE 
ON THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF A FERVENT DISCOURSE YES 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative X 
Involvement of violence  X 
REFERENCES TO HISTORY YES 
Victimisation narrative X 
Pride narrative X 
 
CRITERIA C NATURE OF PROTESTS CONCERNING 
THE DISPUTE  
 
PRESENCE OF PROTESTS YES 
Presence of anti-foreign narrative X 
Involvement of violence  X 
REFERENCES TO HISTORY YES 
Victimisation narrative  
Pride narrative X 
Note:  Dispute type 3 – dispute with a traditionally stronger rival. 
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References to history are implicit in the protests. By exhibiting their 
pride and love for the nation, Vietnamese people showed that they no 
longer tolerate China’s dominance over their nation. For Vietnamese 
people, China’s 2000-year-long overlordship is long gone. This sentiment 
is distinguishable by banners and placards identifying China as an invader. 
One protester brandished a printed out placard with the slogan “Get 
Real. Imperialism is so 19th Century” (South China Morning Post 2014). 
This, combined with the numerous protesters brandishing Vietnamese 
flags and singing the national anthem and revolutionary songs, suggests 
that the Vietnamese are proud to show that they will no longer suffer 
what they consider bullying from their mightier neighbour and will not 
be subordinate to China as they were in the past. Thus, references to 
history during Vietnam’s May 2014 protests carry a narrative of pride 
and no allusions to victimisation.  
Table 5 summarises the testing of Vietnam’s dispute with China 
over maritime territory in the South China Sea – a territorial dispute with 
a traditionally stronger rival – against Criteria A, B and C. 
Conclusion 
It can be concluded from the above analysis that expressions of national-
ism in autocracies such as China and Vietnam are sensitive to the context 
that triggers them. Both China and Vietnam generate different typologies 
of nationalism from one territorial dispute to another. This indicates that 
context is a conditioning factor and deserves greater attention in studies 
of nationalism in autocracies. In light of the geopoliticisation of national-
ism, it is surprising that scholars of nationalism in autocracies do not pay 
closer attention to territorial disputes. Instead, they focus on the struc-
tural characteristics of autocracies as conditioning factors of nationalism. 
As such, what scholars have done thus far is examine nationalism in 
autocracies through discourse analysis in order to explain their variations 
to different degrees of intensity, while taking into account historical 
consciousness and the interplay between state and society. However, 
structural characteristics do not provide sufficient explanation for varia-
tions in expressions of nationalism. Therefore, this paper builds on the 
existing literature of nationalism in autocracies and seeks to further en-
hance the field by factoring in the role of territorial disputes in triggering 
different typologies of nationalism.  
The emphasis on territorial disputes as a conditioning factor for na-
tionalism has been made by highlighting variations in expressions of 
nationalism in China and Vietnam over four territorial disputes. The 
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analytical framework set out above shows that typologies of nationalism 
vary from one dispute to another. Furthermore, there appears to be a 
rough typological pattern over the three types of disputes where some of 
the criteria of expressions of nationalism are similar, if not completely 
identical. Indeed, for dispute type 1 – a dispute with a traditionally weak-
er rival – expressions of nationalism at the official level and through the 
absence of protests correspond. Expressions of nationalism at the non-
official level, however, do not present any typological patterns. For dis-
pute type 2 (a dispute with a rival whose relative strength has varied 
throughout history) and dispute type 3 (a dispute with a traditionally 
stronger rival), similar patterns emerge. Therefore, dispute types 2 and 3 
can be combined to examine typological patterns. Expressions of nation-
alism correspond at the non-official level and in the presence of protests, 
but not at the official level. Overall, the most striking typological pat-
terns are the presence/absence of protests. Expressions of nationalism 
are escalated to that level of intensity only in disputes with a rival whose 
relative strength has varied throughout history or where the rival is tradi-
tionally stronger. That said, whether a type of dispute generates a fixed 
typology of nationalism is not as clear cut as the observation that expres-
sions of nationalism are sensitive to the dispute in question. Therefore, 
what can be concluded with certainty is that the context surrounding a 
particular dispute creates a distinct typology of nationalism.  
Why do territorial disputes with traditionally stronger rivals or with 
a rival whose relative strength has varied throughout history generate 
more intense typologies of nationalism with an escalation to public pro-
tests? The answer to this question will have profound implications for 
the field of international relations. Strong nationalism can provoke the 
escalation of a territorial dispute to dangerous levels and risk a break-out 
into armed conflict caused by mistakes, misunderstandings or mispercep-
tions. Thus, my emphasis in this paper on context triggering expressions 
of nationalism does not rule out the relevance of structural characteris-
tics as conditioning factors of nationalism in autocracies. Like societal 
institutions, regime type and historical consciousness, context is also a 
conditioning factor of nationalism in China and Vietnam. Future studies 
that seek to build an analytical framework for typologies of nationalism 
in autocracies should include as many conditioning factors as possible in 
order to build a solid framework of potential typologies of nationalism in 
an autocracy.  
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